The present study seeks to lay out the most basic elements of the ontology of classical Aš‘arite theology. In several cases this requires a careful examination of the traditional and the formal lexicography of certain key expressions. The topics primarily treated are: how they understood “Being/ existence” and “being/existent” and essential natures; the systematic exploitation of the equivocities of certain expressions within a general context in which other than words there are no universals proves to be elegant as well as (...) insightful; the basic categories of primary entities: independant beings and nonindependant beings, created and uncreated, the equivocity of “being/existent” as predicated of contingent entities on the one hand and of God and His attributes on the other, and certain problems that arise because of the rigid application of the system's underlying analytic principles. Nous essayons ici de presenter les éléments fondamentaux de l'ontologie de l'aš‘arisme classique. Pour quelques expressions, il a fallu examiner la lexicographie et ordinaire et technique pour bien comprendre leur emploi et leur signification. Les sujets examinés sont: le sens de “Etre/existence” et de “être/existant” et le concept de réalité essentielle; l'emploi nuancé des équivocités de quelques expressions dans un contexte où les seuls universaux sont des mots, emploi qui se révèle philosophiquement élégant; les catégories fondamentales des êtres: êtres indépendants et êtres non-indépendants, soit créés soit incréés, l'équivocité de “être/existant” dit des êtres contingents d'une part, de Dieu et ses attributs d'autre part, et enfin quelques difficultiés qui résultent de l'application rigide des principes analytiques du système. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION By way of introduction I wish to indicate briefly something of the scope and aim of this study and to make a few remarks on the perspective ...

Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

This new volume contains addenda and corrigenda to the first three volumes, together with an overall index of names. It concludes the four-volume bibliography of works on Nietzsche’s influence on art and culture in the German-speaking world.

Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wellspring or Circuit?Commentary on Dewey and the Aesthetic UnconsciousnessFrank X. RyanEditor's note: This article contains material similar to a book review by the same author previously published in The Pluralist, vol. 18, no. 2, pp 114–21. The present article represents a further critical use of this material that we deem worthy of publication.in this vital and splendidly crafted work, Bethany Henning recovers a philosophy of aesthetic wisdom far richer (...) than the narrow epistemological lens dominant today. From its start, American philosophy looked beyond Europe's atomistic empiricism toward a continuity between our thought and nature's aesthetic splendor. Jonathan Edwards found beauty in the structure of being reflected in relations among ideas. For Emerson, each of us is a "transparent eyeball" in which nature's beauty fortifies our moral and spiritual agency. At the apex of this tradition is John Dewey, for whom "aesthetic experience [is] the highest mode of human experience" (Henning 55).Although aesthetic theory is usually associated with the cognitive evaluation of art, Dewey explores a broader non-reflective or unconscious dimension. Henning's appropriation of "unconscious"—the cradle of Freud's infantile id—is intentionally provocative. American culture, reflected in academic thought, has largely resisted appeals to subterranean urges and drives. In doing so, however, we perpetuate a myth of rational and moral exceptionalism masking a history of colonialism, oppression, and crass commercialism. In accepting the unconscious, European thought has taken strides to acknowledge and address such ills. Henning wonders whether America might accept "a dynamic unconscious, were it presented with an alternative mythology" (10) and finds a viable candidate in Dewey's underappreciated notion of qualitative immediacy: an "aesthetic (directly felt) connection between ourselves and [End Page 77] the world" (Henning 5). In affirming the unconscious depth of experience, this American reconfiguration welcomes "aesthetic experience back into our philosophical lives" (Henning 5).When embodied meaning supplements cognitive reflection, we come to champion "the sensuous, lived body" as "the primary reality" of qualitative immediacy—a felt aesthetic unity punctuated by "impulsions" arising from an organism's needs (Henning 69). As "a site of adaptive adjustments," Henning continues, "the body is responsive to the brink of coalescence at the point of contact with the world, in which things that are 'outside of it' belong to it" (71). "To move adeptly into aesthetic experience means to be skilled at loosening focal consciousness" so as to cultivate "the essential porousness of the world" (130).With this, the body-mind relation becomes a problem of normative aesthetics, not epistemology. The Cartesian detachment of intellect from nature perpetuated our cultural alienation from our bodies, our environments, and one another (Henning 81–84). With the re-emergence of the body, however, we can begin to acknowledge and heal this trauma.In tapping the significance of qualitative immediacy, of "having" beyond "knowing," Dewey and the Aesthetic Unconscious strives to recover Dewey's remarkable insight into our essential situatedness in the world. This alone establishes its importance. But Henning's book is equally ambitious in suggesting how Dewey's aesthetic understanding can(1). reconfigure the shadowy daemons of Freud's id;(2). replace the myth of American exceptionalism with authentic relationships rooted in pluralist values;(3). rehabilitate the body as an authentic vehicle of expression and communication;(4). vindicate the bold claim that all unified experience is aesthetic; and(5). identify and promote connections forged in shared human experiences.These aims are of inestimable value. I pledge to do whatever I can to defend and advance them. At the outset, however, I feel we must shore up the relationship between two different approaches to thinking about our situatedness in the world: (1) of organic beings existing in a porous world they dynamically interact with, and (2) a phenomenology of experience wherein nonreflective having is an unanalyzed totality from which thought and thing, subject and object, organism and environment, functionally emerge in what Dewey calls the pattern of inquiry. [End Page 78]The general consensus that Dewey failed to reconcile these two approaches—of existence with experience—was dubbed the "deep crack" in Dewey's thought, by Richard Bernstein in 1961. Bernstein laments Dewey's being caught between (1... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Role of Scepticism in Modern Philosophy Reconsidered RICHARD H. POPKIN THE THEORY that the revival of ancient scepticism, and the application of its arguments to the controversies of the sixteenth century, played a vital role in the development of modern philosophy was first suggested by me almost forty years ago. A three-part article in the Review of Metaphysics entided "The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern (...) Philosophy" contained much of the theory.' What was added by the time of my History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (published in x96o,' but finished by 1958 ) was the importance of the sceptical arguments in the controversies of the Reformation and the CounterReformation, and the development of a religious scepticismmfideism--as a way of fending off criticism of basic religious beliefs.s One of the first reviews of my book was by Charles B. Schmitt,4 which he soon followed with his volume on Gianfrancesco Pico and then one on Cicero Scepticus.5 Before Charles Schmitt and I entered this arena, scepticism as a living philosophical view was hardly mentioned in histories of philosophy, which, by and large, saw modern philosophy as a rejection of Scholasticism, with nothing in between. One leaped from William of Ockham and Duns Scotus to Francis Bacon and Descartes, with perhaps a momentary nod to Montaigne as an amus- ' R. H. Popkin, "The ScepticalCrisisand the Riseof Modern Philosophy," Parts I, II, and III, ReviewofMetaphysics8 0953-54): 131--51,3O7--33,and 499-51o. First published in the University of Utrecht series of Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy (Assen:Van Gorcum). sThis part of the story appeared independently in my article, "Scepticismand the CounterReformation in France," Archivfiir Reformatio~geschichte51 (a96o): 58-88. 4This appeared in Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch~3 (1963):455. 5His GianfrancescoPico dellaMirandola(I469-x533) and His Critiqueof Aristotleappeared in 1967, and CiceroScepticus:A Studyof theInfluenceof theAcademicain the Renaissancein 197~,both published in the International Archivesof the History of Ideas put out by Nijhoffin The Hague. [5ol] 502 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 1:4 OCTOBER 1993 ing figure who provided Bacon with his stylistic form and Descartes with the opening line for the Discourse on Method. There were practically no articles about or studies of scepticism as a philosophical attitude or activity in modern philosophy before we went to work. The American philosopher Roderick Chisholm had written an article on Sextus and modern empiricism, and that was about it.6 When I took my first course in the history of philosophy with John Herman Randall, I frankly could not make much out of Plato or Aristotle, but when we were assigned to read Sextus Empiricus, I found an author who made sense. Later in the course I was introduced to Hume, whom Randall hated, and I loved. In a course with Paul Oskar Kristeller a few years later, on Hellenistic philosophy, Sextus appeared as a serious figure. A couple of years after that, in a seminar with Charles Hendel on Hume, I wrote a paper on Sextus and Hume. I showed it to Kristeller, who said drily and carefully that it might be worth looking into whether Hume had read Sextus, and whether there was a prior tradition of scepticism in European philosophy. Thus was I set off on the quest. Schmitt and I not only offered a lot of evidence previously ignored or unknown about the recovery of sceptical texts and their use in the philosophical discussions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but we also offered a new paradigm, a new way of conceiving what problems were being agitated, a new way of understanding the kinds of answers being given as ways of resolving the sceptical crisis. The reception of our theory indicated that it provided a more meaningful picture of the making of the modern mind than what had previously been proposed.7 What I should like to deal with now are three questions: Has our theory stood up over almost four decades? Has it had to be revised or amended? And does it need to be expanded (as I have been doing) to encompass another kind of scepticism, that directed against traditional religion from about... (shrink)

This paper is a response to INQUIRY editor Frank Fair’s invitation to me to write a reflective piece that sheds light on my involvement in the field of Critical Thinking Studies . My response is in two parts. The two parts together might be called “Reflections on the nature of critical thinking and on its status across the college/university curriculum.” The parts together have been written with a long term and large-scale end in view. If successful the two parts (...) will shed light on why the critical thinking movement has not yet contributed significantly to human emancipation or to more just and fair-minded communities . It will also present some strategies for making such a contribution. (shrink)

Giving advice to Henry Bolingbroke was a pastime that could be very rewarding or very dangerous. Consider the following two cases. In May 1401, a little over nineteen months after Henry had deposed his cousin Richard and ascended the throne, his friend and confessor Philip Repyngdon, at that time the abbot of St. Mary de Prè in Leicester and chancellor of Oxford, sent Henry a long letter about the condition of the realm. Henry had personally requested such a report, (...) according to the version of the letter preserved in Adam of Usk's Chronicle: “Whereas your singular serenity did require of me, the least of your servants, when last I went out from before you with heavy heart, that, if I should hear aught adverse, I should make it known unto your excellency without delay, now, as your most obedient servant, do I take my pen in hand to show what I have heard and seen.” And Repyngdon had apparently heard and seen a lot, as he claimed that “law and justice are banished from the realm; thefts, murders, adulteries, fornications, extortions, oppressions of the poor, hurts, wrongs, and much reproach, are rife; and one tyrant will doth serve for law.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 453 PAUL HENRY (19o6-1984) Paul Henry was a renowned scholar of Plotinus and Neo-Platonism. Born in Louvain, the son of a chemistry professor at the university there, he was sent to school in England during World War I. He then returned to Belgium, and studied philosophy and theology at Louvain, and joined the Society of Jesus. He did further studies in Paris in Middle Eastern culture, and (...) studied Arabic in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In Rome he did further studies and received an S.T.D. from the Pontifical Gregorian University, as well as a Licentiate in Sacred Scripture from the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was appointed professor at the Institut Catholique in Paris. He published several fundamental studies on Plotinus and the development of NeoPlatonism in Western thought. He and Hans Rudolf Schwyzer of Zurich collaborated on the critical edition of Plotinus's Enneads,and he and his former student, Pierre Hadot, produced the critical edition of the theological treatises of Marius Victorinus. Paul Henry made his first visit to the United States in 1952 where he was a visiting professor at Fordham. At a meeting of the American Philosophical Association that year he met Richard Popkin. They became close friends. This led to Henry being invited to be a visiting professor at the University of Iowa, to give the Foster lecture on the immortality of the soul at the University of California, Berkeley, and to his later being appointed a regular professor at the University of California, San Diego. He also was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Duke, Northwestern, the College of New Rochelle and St. John's University in New York. Paul Henry was an important consultant and adviser to the JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy in its early years. With his vast erudition, his understanding of the different kinds of scholarship being undertaken in Europe and America, in Catholic and non-Catholic institutions, he was able to assist us in finding the best scholarly articles, the best referees and reviewers of materials in many fields. Paul Henry was a person of immense charm, vivacity and humanity. He was able to break down barriers between people of differing backgrounds, and to form deep, abiding friendships with students and scholars all over the world. He took great interest in a variety of ventures to increase learning and understanding in intellectual history. His concerns ranged from early Christian thought, pagan Neo-Platonism, the fusion of the two in Victorinus and Augustine, up to leading intellectual ideas in modern European thought such as the structuralism of LeviStrauss and the theology of Teilhard de Chardin. He encouraged young and maturing scholars in America and Europe, and tried to bring out the very best of their abilities. He encouraged the understanding of different thought systems, the appreciation of their strengths and weaknesses. And, perhaps as much as any one in the post-second-World-War period, he encouraged frank and open discussions between Catholic and non-Catholic scholars, and thereby built many bridges. Those who knew him have profited immensely from his learning, wisdom and humanity. Those who worked to launch and develop the Journal are especially grateful for his help and support in the early days of this venture. We hope that his scholarship will encourage many others to develop fresh understandings of Neo-Platonism and its importance in the philosophical, theological and scientific world, from ancient times to the present. He will be sorely missed, but he has left a great legacy to those working in the history of philosophy. RICHARD H. POPKIN... (shrink)

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of (...) supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma. (shrink)

I first started reading Derrida during the 1970s. Like many others, I was initially perplexed, confused, and sometimes downright infuriated. I could not make sense of what he was “up to” or why there was so much fuss about him. Frankly, I wondered if it was worth the effort. Much of his writing seemed like overindulgent word play. But I stuck with it. A primary reason was my wife, Carol. She is a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Bryn (...) Mawr College and is a great admirer of Derrida. Because of my respect for Carol’s intelligence and insight, I was determined to discover for myself what she found so intriguing and exciting. The breakthrough came when I read his classic essay, “Metaphysics and Violence,” one of the most sensitive, perceptive, and illuminating discussions of Emmanuel Levinas. Many thinkers “discovered” Levinas because of Derrida’s essay. There is a special quality about this eloquent essay that riveted my attention. It is an act of profound friendship and extremely moving. Derrida not only beautifully and delicately explores the intricacies of Levinas’ intellectual development, but also probes the crevices in Levinas’ thought. I still find this essay to be an intensely exquisite tribute to Levinas—a thinker that deeply influenced Derrida’s own ethical thinking. When I first read “Metaphysics and Violence,” I felt that its passion and seriousness did not “fit” with the popular image of Derrida as an irresponsible and irritatingly playful nihilist. So I started to read him again. I began to notice something that few commentators discussed: the way in which ethical-political themes are woven into the texture of virtually all his writings. There is a pervasive—almost obsessive—concern with response, responsibility, and decision. (shrink)

I first started reading Derrida during the 1970s. Like many others, I was initially perplexed, confused, and sometimes downright infuriated. I could not make sense of what he was “up to” or why there was so much fuss about him. Frankly, I wondered if it was worth the effort. Much of his writing seemed like overindulgent word play. But I stuck with it. A primary reason was my wife, Carol. She is a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Bryn (...) Mawr College and is a great admirer of Derrida. Because of my respect for Carol’s intelligence and insight, I was determined to discover for myself what she found so intriguing and exciting. The breakthrough came when I read his classic essay, “Metaphysics and Violence,” one of the most sensitive, perceptive, and illuminating discussions of Emmanuel Levinas. Many thinkers “discovered” Levinas because of Derrida’s essay. There is a special quality about this eloquent essay that riveted my attention. It is an act of profound friendship and extremely moving. Derrida not only beautifully and delicately explores the intricacies of Levinas’ intellectual development, but also probes the crevices in Levinas’ thought. I still find this essay to be an intensely exquisite tribute to Levinas—a thinker that deeply influenced Derrida’s own ethical thinking. When I first read “Metaphysics and Violence,” I felt that its passion and seriousness did not “fit” with the popular image of Derrida as an irresponsible and irritatingly playful nihilist. So I started to read him again. I began to notice something that few commentators discussed: the way in which ethical-political themes are woven into the texture of virtually all his writings. There is a pervasive—almost obsessive—concern with response, responsibility, and decision. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim to have (...) "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of (...) supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

On March 12, 2018, I received an email from André De Tienne, General Editor of the Peirce Edition Project. He recommended that I visit the Francis Blake archives at the Massachusetts Historical Society, remarking, Francis Blake was a cousin of Charles Peirce. I have not yet figured out how that cousinage works out genealogically. In any case, on 13 January 1893, the day CSP and Juliette returned from Boston to New York after the Lowell Lectures, they first took a trip (...) to Weston, MA, to visit Frank Blake, and from there they went to Worcester to visit W. Stanley Hall at Clark University. … If you look in folder R L49, it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Building a FoundationRichard KeidanA guiding principle of Judaism is "tzedakah," which translates as charity but actually means righteousness, reflecting that tzedakah is an obligation, not a choice. This concept of social justice was taught to me at home, at school and at synagogue. I gave to charities and did occasional charitable work. As my parents had taught me, I taught my own children the spirit of giving, but it (...) did come from a place of obligation, not passion. I have since come to learn that there is a world of difference between just fulfilling our obligations to each other and letting them guide the kind of person we become.It is ironic how the process of becoming a doctor—a person society expects to be selfless— requires total self-absorption. Think about it. I was trained to compete with my classmates in order to be accepted to the best university, medical school, residency, and then fellowship. I spent more than one hundred hours each week in the hospital during surgical residency. If I had free time, I wanted to do what I wanted to do. I was so focused on the end result that I had little time to think of others, let alone to ponder the inequities of the world.Several events led to the awakening of my conscience. One was an opportunity to go to Ethiopia and perform a couple weeks' worth of cancer surgery through Mother Teresa's Clinic. Quite frankly, I went because it seemed like an exciting adventure. However, I was completely overwhelmed by the experience. The conditions were abominable. The stories of each of my patients were heart-wrenching. I encountered a 14-year-old boy, the same age as my son, who had a tumor 15 cm in thickness wrapped around his neck. In order to hide the tumor he wore a scarf, but this still did not prevent him from being shunned. He traveled by himself for several days on a bus to reach the clinic. He had no one to advocate on his behalf, was unable to speak the local language, had never been outside his village (let alone in a motor vehicle), and he fearlessly underwent major surgery all by himself.The inequalities in health care compared to my suburban hospital were unfathomable. I cried every night in my hotel room. There seemed to be no solution to this situation. Soon after I returned home, Ethiopia became a distant memory. The experience cut me to the bone, but for whatever reason, I did not rally. I did not see myself as part of the solution. It took an entirely different international experience to open my eyes.There is a saying, "One goes to the Himalayas to see the mountains, but returns for the culture." In 1982, on a sabbatical from my surgical training, I went to Nepal to see the Himalayas, but fell in love with the people. Living in the most basic shelters, eating the most basic diets, with no access to clean water or toilets and little access to health care or education, the people seemed happy. I was invited into their homes and lives, slept on their straw mats, ate their rice and drank their tea. Their spirit and sense of contentment drew me back over the years 15 times. Nepal became a sanctuary for me, a place that gave me time to reflect upon what is truly important, a place that provided energy and inspiration for me. Its public health and education needs were apparent to me, but again, I felt sympathy for my Nepali friends; I did not see that I could—and must—help.It took a chance meeting to change that. Two years ago, I was on an exploratory trek on the Great Himalayan Trail in the Kanchenjunga region of Nepal. Namgyal was our sirdar (head sherpa guide), short in stature, but a giant of a man. Lacking a formal education, but very bright and [End Page 84] motivated, he rose through the ranks from porter all the way to lead sherpa of Everest Expeditions. He had reached the summit of Everest ten times by the age of thirty. He led... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

We live in a metaphysical age. And I do not mean just that too many people still believe The Prophecies of Nostradamus and/or the horoscopes found in most local newspapers. It is a metaphysical age among philosophers – even among those who shun horoscopes and are frankly embarrassed to fi nd Nostradamus so prominently displayed in the metaphysics section of their campus bookstore. Nowadays, distinguished philosophers in prestigious departments proudly call themselves metaphysicians. They all know, of course, that Carnap and (...) his Viennese friends campaigned in the late twenties and early thirties against metaphysics. (shrink)

Recent essays by Michael Friedman1 and William Demopoulos2 on Carnap’s late approach to analyticity in the theoretical language make a convincing case for the continuing philosophic interest of this part of Carnap’s work. The present essay is intended not to disagree with any of these essays but to raise a logically prior worry as to whether Carnap’s account of analyticity here is well motivated and consistent with other attractive aspects of his view. To do this I outline, in §1, (...) class='Hi'>Frank Ramsey’s approach to theories and the so-called Ramsey sentence. This will allow us to trace the steps by which Carnap came to use the Ramsey sentence in developing an account of analyticity for the theoretical language. Then, in §2, I articulate my own uneasiness with what I see as Carnap’s motivation. Finally, in §3, I express my practical reservations about how well Carnap’s approach fits with other aspects of his view. This is not intended as a refutation but rather as a reflection on how we can learn from Carnap and as a reminder of how much more we have to do. (shrink)

Recent essays by Michael Friedman1 and William Demopoulos2 on Carnap’s late approach to analyticity in the theoretical language make a convincing case for the continuing philosophic interest of this part of Carnap’s work. The present essay is intended not to disagree with any of these essays but to raise a logically prior worry as to whether Carnap’s account of analyticity here is well motivated and consistent with other attractive aspects of his view. To do this I outline, in §1, (...) class='Hi'>Frank Ramsey’s approach to theories and the so-called Ramsey sentence. This will allow us to trace the steps by which Carnap came to use the Ramsey sentence in developing an account of analyticity for the theoretical language. Then, in §2, I articulate my own uneasiness with what I see as Carnap’s motivation. Finally, in §3, I express my practical reservations about how well Carnap’s approach fits with other aspects of his view. This is not intended as a refutation but rather as a reflection on how we can learn from Carnap and as a reminder of how much more we have to do. (shrink)

Some of the best philosophers do not hold academic appointments in philosophy departments. Wouldn't you rather have the ghost of Frank Ramsey (the Cambridge mathematician who died in the 1920s) as a hall mate instead of some of your current colleagues? Confining our attention to the living, we find some economists among the more philosophically inclined intellectuals. The best of these fellow traveling economistphilosophers are the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen and also John Roemer. In the early 1980s Roemer (...) did brilliant work on the analytical foundations of Marxist theory. He has also accomplished an imaginative retooling of the Lange-Lerner models of market socialism. For the past dozen years or so Roemer has been thinking and writing about distributive justice. This work has culminated in the two impressive books that are the subject of this review essay. Theories of Distributive Justice is explicitly a bridge-building effort. Roemer announces that his aim is to provide a philosophical perspective on recent writings by economists that are relevant to the topic of distributive justice and to provide an economist's perspective on recent writings by philosophers on distributive justice. He further announces that his primary aim is to facilitate traffic in one direction--to interpret and formulate the ideas of contemporary philosophers on distributive justice so as to introduce them to economists with a view to increasing the philosophical sophistication of work by economists on these normative issues. I endorse this aim. But since I am not a trained economist, I shall not attempt to assess the extent to which this project is successfully completed. This review explores the adequacy of Roemer's survey of contemporary theories of justice and the philosophical interest of his own contributions to debates about distributive justice. These Roemerian contributions appear interspersed among critical discussions in Theories of Distributive Justice as well as in the more recent monograph Equality of Opportunity. 1.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle on TruthMark Richard WheelerPaolo Crivelli. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xi + 340. Cloth, $85.00.A thorough contemporary study of Aristotle's theory of truth is welcome. Adopting a frankly analytic approach, Professor Crivelli addresses all of the most important Aristotelian texts on truth. He provides close and careful exegesis, attending to philological and interpretive difficulties related to the manuscripts and alternative translations. (...) In the spirit of Hintikka, Łukasiewicz, and Mignucci, the tools of contemporary logical analysis are applied effectively and yield rigorous restatements of Aristotle's concepts and arguments. The most pressing questions about truth are posed. Crivelli scrutinizes prevailing interpretations, both traditional and contemporary, contrasts them with his own, and always maintains a fair and balanced dialectical stance. Where pertinent, he compares Aristotle's approach with contemporary alternatives. Anyone interested in Aristotle's theory of truth must read this book.Crivelli divides the book into four parts. He provides an excellent detailed summary of his interpretation in the Introduction. In Part I, he presents the core of his interpretation of Aristotle's theory of truth. In Part II, he argues that Aristotle's account is a kind of "correspondence-as-isomorphism" theory, and he responds to the Liar paradox and to the problem of "empty" terms. In Part III, he considers two diachronic aspects of Aristotle's theory—change in truth value and the truth value of future tense assertions.The book is rich in interpretation and argument. I shall limit myself here to a few salient points.In Chapter 1, Crivelli argues that Aristotle posits three kinds of truth-bearers: linguistic expressions, beliefs, and objects. His discussion of linguistic expressions in terms of utterance tokens is sharp, though it is silent about written expression tokens. Although he does not dismiss the psychological dimension of Aristotle's semantic theory, Crivelli assumes that Aristotelian beliefs and thoughts are well enough understood as analogous to linguistic truth bearers, ignoring altogether the role of phantasia in Aristotle's semantic theory. Given the importance of representational thought in Aristotle's semantic theory and the wealth of relevant texts, this is disappointing.The chief problem in Chapter 1, however, is Crivelli's proposed ontological scheme. Among objects, in addition to simple immaterial and composite material substances, Crivelli argues that Aristotle posits composite "states-of-affairs" that bear truth and falsehood, exhibit modal properties, and serve as objects of propositional attitudes. He relies on Metaphysics 10.29, 1024b17–21 and 10.10, 1051a34–1051b17 for this claim, and it is the weakest point in the book. Crivelli's abstract, propositionally-structured states-of-affairs do not resemble any of the familiar denizens of Aristotle's ontology, and the textual evidence he offers is insufficient, leaving it unclear how they would fit into Aristotle's general semantic theory. Clearly, they generate difficulties for an Aristotelian account of propositional attitudes.In Chapters 2 and 3, Crivelli presents the core of his interpretation of Aristotle's theory of truth—the truth conditions for assertions and beliefs. Crivelli's proposed analyses are dense but carefully wrought. The related Appendices 3–5 are very helpful, especially Appendix 5 which provides a formal presentation of a principle part of the theory.In Chapter 4, Crivelli argues that Aristotle's account is a correspondence-as-isomorphism theory of truth for assertions and beliefs. The resulting interpretation establishes a clear sense in which assertions and beliefs "correspond" to reality. Crivelli then proposes a solution to the Liar paradox based on a shrewd reading of Sophistici Elenchi 25, 180a34–180b7 that turns on a principled rejection of the Principle of Bivalence. While leaving Aristotle vulnerable to the Strengthened Liar, it is clear that Aristotle has resources from which to draw in responding to alethic paradox.In Chapter 5, Crivelli confronts the notorious problem of "vacuous" and "empty" terms. Such terms signify nothing, on Crivelli's interpretation, and simple assertions involving vacuous and empty terms turn out to be disguised composite assertions. [End Page 469]According to Aristotle, utterances can be true at one time and false at another, a jarring claim for... (shrink)

First published in 1979. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Bringing together essays that span the career of I.A. Richards--as both literary critic and pedagogue--this collection provides a much-needed re-introduction to a thinker whose works have been largely neglected of late. Carefully chosen, edited, and annotated, the selections make accessible a wide array of Richards's ideas on language and learning, focusing on his discussion of literacy, his critique of positivist linguistics, his explorations of C.S. Peirce's semiotics, and his theory of translation, which led not only to his well-known analysis of (...) the structure and foundation of metaphor but to one of the earliest and most cogent formulations of reader-response theory. Berthoff's editing eliminates the distracting elements of Richards's style--the digressions and obscure allusions that have often hindered readers, and have in part contributed to the neglect his work has met with in recent years--while identifying and illuminating the chief principles of his critical thought and practice. Organized in four parts--Practical Criticism, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, The Meaning of Meaning, and Design for Escape--the book offers a lucid introduction to Richards's writings, with valuable headnotes to each section and a unique index of "speculative instruments" that examines the principal ideas Richards thought with. Readers are certain to find this volume essential to an understanding of Richards's "practical criticism," and invaluable in sharpening and re-directing their own thoughts on current linguistic practice, literary criticism, and educational theory. (shrink)

This reprint of a collection of essays on problems concerning future generations examines questions such as whether intrinsic value should be placed on the preservation of mankind, what are our obligations to posterity, and whether potential people have moral rights.

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...) (Harv Rev Psychiatry 15:109–117, 2007 ), it is argued that reality monitoring studies examining the cognitive underpinnings of hallucinations have not reflected the phenomenological complexity of AVHs in their experimental designs and theoretical framework. The second example, based on Jones (Schizophr Bull, in press, 2010 ), involves a critical examination of the phenomenology of AVHs in the context of two other prominent cognitive models: inner speech and intrusions from memory. It will be shown that, for both examples, the integration of a phenomenological analysis provides important improvements both on a methodological, theoretical and clinical level. This will be followed by insights and critiques from philosophy and clinical psychiatry—both of which offer a phenomenological alternative to the empiricist–rationalist conceptualisation of AVHs inherent to the cognitive sciences approach. Finally, the paper will conclude with ideas as to how the cognitive sciences may integrate these latter perspectives into their methodological and theoretical programmes. (shrink)

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...) (Harv Rev Psychiatry 15:109–117, 2007), it is argued that reality monitoring studies examining the cognitive underpinnings of hallucinations have not reflected the phenomenological complexity of AVHs in their experimental designs and theoretical framework. The second example, based on Jones (Schizophr Bull, in press, 2010), involves a critical examination of the phenomenology of AVHs in the context of two other prominent cognitive models: inner speech and intrusions from memory. It will be shown that, for both examples, the integration of a phenomenological analysis provides important improvements both on a methodological, theoretical and clinical level. This will be followed by insights and critiques from philosophy and clinical psychiatry—both of which offer a phenomenological alternative to the empiricist–rationalist conceptualisation of AVHs inherent to the cognitive sciences approach. Finally, the paper will conclude with ideas as to how the cognitive sciences may integrate these latter perspectives into their methodological and theoretical programmes. (shrink)

Background: Editorial peer review is universally used but little studied. We examined the relationship between external reviewers' recommendations and the editorial outcome of manuscripts undergoing external peer-review at the Journal of General Internal Medicine. Methodology/Principal Findings: We examined reviewer recommendations and editors' decisions at JGIM between 2004 and 2008. For manuscripts undergoing peer review, we calculated chance-corrected agreement among reviewers on recommendations to reject versus accept or revise. Using mixed effects logistic regression models, we estimated intra-class correlation coefficients at the (...) reviewer and manuscript level. Finally, we examined the probability of rejection in relation to reviewer agreement and disagreement. The 2264 manuscripts sent for external review during the study period received 5881 reviews provided by 2916 reviewers; 28% of reviews recommended rejection. Chance corrected agreement on rejection among reviewers was 0.11. In mixed effects models adjusting for study year and manuscript type, the reviewer-level ICC was 0.23 and the manuscript-level ICC was 0.17. The editors' overall rejection rate was 48%: 88% when all reviewers for a manuscript agreed on rejection and 20% when all reviewers agreed that the manuscript should not be rejected. Conclusions/Significance: Reviewers at JGIM agreed on recommendations to reject vs. accept/revise at levels barely beyond chance, yet editors placed considerable weight on reviewers' recommendations. Efforts are needed to improve the reliability of the peer-review process while helping editors understand the limitations of reviewers' recommendations. © 2010 Kravitz et al. (shrink)

The Promise of Phenomenology: Posthumous Papers of John Wild includes articles that remained unpublished during Wild's lifetime, some of which he was preparing for publication, a journal that he kept, as well as a masterful exposition and commentary on Emmanuel Levinas' book, Totality and Infinity. This book gives a lively picture of a master philosopher at work conveying the vitality and importance of philosophy to everyday life.

The importance of nitrogen fixation, in assimilation of atmospheric dinitrogen for eventual storage in plant proteins, has resulted in extensive study of both plant and bacterial genes involved in this process. To date, the major plant genes analysed are the leghaemoglobins. These are closely related to the animal globins, allowing us to compare their gene organization, expression and evolution. We review here the progress and results of leghaemoglobin analysis and the comparisons with the related animal globins.

On the origin of the cinematic odyssey Kubrick remarks: 'I do not remember when I got the idea to do the film. I became interested in extraterrestrial intelligence in the universe, and was convinced that the universe was *full* of intelligent life, and so it seemed time to make a film'. But as to the confusion surrounding the film upon its release, and in particular many thinking Floyd had gone to the 'planet' Clavius he said: 'Why they think there's a (...) planet Clavius I'll never know. But they hear him [Floyd] asked, 'Where are you going?', and he says, 'I'm going to Clavius'. With many people -- *boom* -- that one word registers in their heads and they don't look at fifteen shots of the moon; they don't see he's going to the Moon'. At the same time he rhetorically asked: 'How could we possibly appreciate the Mona Lisa if Leonardo had written at the bottom of the canvas: 'The lady is smiling because she is hiding a secret from her lover'. This would shackle the viewer to reality, and I don't want this to happen to _2001_'. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to which information communication technologies have worked as instruments of perpetuating social exclusion in developing countries.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses theoretical and conceptual analysis method based on an extensive survey of literature. It greatly draws from the theoretical and empirical insights of social policy sub disciplines of social inclusion/exclusion and social aspects of ICTs.FindingsThe paper finds that ICTs in developing countries work to further social marginalization and exclusion. The argument is that developing (...) countries already experience high levels of social exclusion and as a result, ICTs deepen this exclusion.Originality/valueTheoretically, the paper contributes to the development of literature on the impacts of ICTs in developing countries which are in most cases only assumed. The paper is also pivotal for policy analysis purposes as it informs policy makers on appropriate interventions that can ensure sustainable integration of the socially excluded groups in developing countries. In addition, this paper creates a research sub area for further empirical analysis. (shrink)